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ABSTRACT 
The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) sub-region has large deposits of hydrocarbons and 
other natural resources.  There is now a stiff international competition among 
industrialized nations including the United States, some European countries, China, 
Japan, and India that are looking for new, safer, and more reliable sources of energy as a 
result of the Middle East crisis. Extra-regional competitions for oil, while boosting the 
economy of the sub-region have also exposed the area to increased security risks. Sub-
regional resources and potential are presently being undermined by multifaceted 
domestic, sub-regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. These challenge the 
sub-regional states, including Nigeria, with limited capacity for maritime security. 
Assessment of the sub-regional naval forces based on their Order of Battle, shows that 
most of the navies cannot police beyond their territorial waters.  
This study presents an integrated collective maritime security strategy for the sub-
region. The strategy proposes measures to protect the maritime environment from 
unauthorized use and to develop member states' capabilities to deal with the emerging 
security threats. Additionally, it would encourage collaboration with extra-regional 
powers and oil majors in efforts to transform naval capabilities and improve 
interoperability to meet the challenges of the changing security threats within the sub-
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The end of the Cold War in 1989, the collapse of communism, and the breakup of 
the Soviet Union led to remarkable changes, transforming global international relations 
from bipolar to uni-polar politics.  The main actors today are the United States and its 
allies. At the same time, democratic and economic reforms across the globe create a focal 
point for international attention. Its emergence as the sole super-power puts the United 
States, with its focus on globalization and the enthronement of democratic governance 
worldwide, in a position to dictate major global economic, political, social and security 
issues.1 
Nevertheless, the world faces widespread threats and uncertainties. The 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States brought a new dimension to the 
war on terror, giving it the center stage in emerging global politics.2  Meanwhile, ongoing 
Middle East crises, instability in the Persian Gulf Region, and the U.S. invasion and 
occupation of Iraq have exacerbated global energy instability.3  
Some analysts ascribe these situations to a stepped up struggle for political control 
over oil and natural gas.  The politics of oil have always been of strategic interest to both 
producers and consumers. Some major countries have become wary of the reliability and 
security of their traditional sources of oil and natural gas because of unstable political and 
security situations in regions where these resources are abundant. Hence, the most 
industrialized nations, including the United States, Japan, China and many European 
Union (EU) countries, now seek new, safer and more reliable sources of supply.4 As a 
result, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), with its abundant economic resources, has emerged as 
one of such area of interest.  
                                                 
1 Mark T. Berger, The Battle of Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (New York: Routledge 
Curzon, 2004), 123. 
2 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 
142. 
3 Anyu J. Ndumbe, “West African Oil, U.S. Energy Policy and African’s Development Strategies,” 
Article online; available from http://muse.jhu.edu; Internet: accessed 20 October 2007. 
4 Ibid. 
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The GoG sub-regional oil fields are increasingly attractive to oil companies 
because they deliver higher profits per barrel than oil from most other parts of the world.5 
Similarly, the sub-region has proven reserves of 46 billion barrels, and with extensive 
exploration and exploitation efforts underway, this is expected to hit 100 billion barrels 
by the year 2010.6 Oil industry experts predict that by 2022, the industry will have 
invested more than $40 billion in the sub-region. Furthermore, according to the U.S. 
National Intelligence Estimate Report, oil supply levels from the sub-region to the United 
States are expected to grow from the current 16 percent of U.S. oil imports to 25 percent 
by the year 2015.7 In addition, the natural gas production potential of the GoG sub-region 
is another reason for increased interest of the world’s major energy consumers.  
External interests in the sub-region have grown as competition for influence in the 
sub-region has taken on new dimensions. Against the backdrop of ongoing competition 
for crude oil resources between the United States and European countries, China, India 
and Japan have swiftly enlarged their interests with both positive and negative results. 
The presence of these external interests have resulted in huge investments and increased 
shipping activities. Multinational companies in the energy sector compete for oil 
exploration licenses and currently spend billions of dollars and euros to erect drilling 
platforms, pipelines and transport hubs. In addition to bringing positive prospects to the 
sub-region, these increased activities have created challenging security issues including 
increased piracy, poaching, terrorism, militant youth activities, environmental 
degradation, illegal bunkering, oil pipeline destruction and international conflicts.8 These 
security issues need to be addressed to make the maritime environment investor-friendly 
and to safeguard the interests of member-states of this sub-region, particularly Nigeria, 
which is the focus of this thesis.  
 
                                                 




8 M. F.  Kupolokun,  “Petroleum and Security in Africa,” paper presented to the Nigerian National 
Security Council,  September 2003, 4. 
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Nigeria’s defense policy seeks to ensure stability within the West African sub-
region by 1) making the Nigerian Armed Forces one of the most capable and efficient in 
the continent, 2) becoming a full partner in United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) 
operations, and 3) becoming an effective partner in the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS).9 Ensuring stability and protection of sub-regional marine 
resources requires Nigeria to take the initiative in strengthening the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission (GGC) and ECOWAS. Nigeria needs to partner with member states to 
develop a strategy to stem growing security threats resulting from the new strategic 
importance of the sub-region.  
1. Statement of the Problem 
The emerging security threats, if left unchecked, can lead to instability in the sub-
region and adversely impact its economic, social and political development. Also, the 
GoG's vast sea area presents great challenges to the Nigerian nation and the Nigerian 
Navy's (NN) capacity to sustain a protective presence.  This problem is further 
compounded by the relatively low capacity of the navies of the sub-region's member 
states. The inability of most of these navies to police beyond their territorial waters 
exposes the vulnerable sea areas to exploitation.  
2. Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how recent international interests in the 
GoG sub-region affect the maritime security arrangements there. The study examines the 
effectiveness of current Nigerian and sub-regional security strategies in addressing the 
emerging security environment. The inadequacy of current strategy leads to a proposal 
for a more robust strategy to counter evolving threats. Developing a new strategy requires 
answers to these questions: 
• What is the geo-strategic importance of the GoG sub-region? 
• Who are the stakeholders in the sub-region, including external interests? 
• What are the emerging security challenges? 
                                                 
9 Rowland Oritsejafor, “National Defense Policy Objective,” lecture delivered to the Nigerian National 
War College, October 2006, 24. 
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The main question of the thesis is what new strategy is most likely to stem the 
emerging security threats? 
3. Relevance of the Study 
This thesis will benefit policymakers and stakeholders at the Nigerian Defense, 
Naval Headquarters, and Naval Authorities of member states who are responsible for 
defense and security within the GoG sub-region. It will assist the formulation of 
appropriate policies for the maritime defense of the sub-region in general and Nigeria in 
particular. The study highlights the importance of protecting economic resources within 
the GoG maritime environment. Finally, the study is expected to contribute to 
knowledge, fill gaps in the literature on maritime defense and serve as resource material 
for future studies on the GoG maritime domain.  
4. Methodology 
The thesis is aimed at developing an integrated maritime security strategy to 
counter the emerging security challenges in the light of the growing strategic importance 
of the GoG sub-region. Accordingly, the research method is qualitative. Studies were 
carried out on naval maritime strategy, the concept of sea power, national interest, 
defense policy, and maritime environments. Primary information was collected through 
unstructured interviews with stakeholders and my experiences having come from the sub-
region.  Secondary information was sourced from libraries, archives and online.  
Secondary information include review of relevant works on the Persian Gulf and Indian 
Ocean security arrangements to draw insights from their experiences, as these two 
regions share security challenges similar to those in the GoG maritime domain. 
5. Experiences of Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean Regions    
The Persian Gulf, bordered by 23 littoral states, is a strategic land bridge between 
three continents, a situation that presents many security challenges and attributes 
comparable to the GoG. Strategically, the Persian Gulf is important because of its 
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abundant oil reserves and sea lines of communication (SLOC).10 For centuries, the region 
has served as an arena of international concentration and rivalry. The involvement of 
external powers in the region arises from motivations ranging from commerce and 
political rivalry to imperial security. Political rivalry emerges from the drive of extra-
regional powers for domination of the Gulf, ostensibly to ensure easy access to oil. 
Countries that have dominated the region since the early fifteenth century include 
Portugal, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany and the United States. 
There is a general consensus that the states of the Persian Gulf region operate in a 
volatile and changing security environment.  Observers believe that there are three poles 
to the problem.11 Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are on 
one axis of the pole, Iran on a second axis and Iraq on the third axis. Saudi Arabia and 
other GCC states prefer to maintain the present political and strategic status quo, but Iran 
and Iraq reject the American intervention to preserve regional security. With such 
intervention, Iran feels that its rightful position as leading power in the Gulf has been 
challenged. Similarly, Iraq appears to have ambitions as a major player in the region and 
the Arab world. On the whole, there is no symmetry among the three poles.12 This means 
that the region has no form of collective maritime security. Consequently, the region 
remains dangerous to its peoples and to the rest of the world because it is very unstable 
and a breeding ground for various terrorist organizations. 
Furthermore, analysts conversant with the region’s politics note that Persian Gulf 
leaders have not made collective maritime security strategy an important focus of their 
regional policy. Individual states respond to their vulnerabilities with traditional 
defensive measures, military modernization, and in some cases with renewed 
commitments to political and economic reforms.13 The formation of the Baghdad Pact in 
                                                 
10 John E. Peterson, “The Historical Pattern of Gulf Security,” in Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. 
Sick, eds., Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles, and the Search for Consensus (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 7-31. 
11 Andrew Rathmell et al., “A New Persian Gulf Security System,” RAND Issue Paper, Article online, 
available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP248/IP248.pdf; Internet: accessed 22 January 
2008. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ellen Laipson et al., “Security Sector Reform in the Gulf,” A Joint Project of the Henry L. Stimson 
Center and U.S. Army’s Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. 
Stimson Center, 2006), 7. 
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the 1950s as a kind of protective arc around the vital Gulf oil-producing region has not 
been effective. The only effective maritime security in the region is the coordinated air 
and sea power provided by the U.S. to cover choke points at Bal al-Mandab, the Gulf of 
Suez, and Gibraltar, as well as ports of entry. 
The Indian Ocean region is another maritime environment with similarities to the 
GoG sub-region. Like the GoG with a large number of littoral states (23), the Indian 
Ocean is fronted by 35 nations.14 The Indian Ocean has many choke points, including the 
Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Lombok and the Sundae Strait. Like the GoG and the 
Persian Gulf, the strategic importance of this region lies in its sea lines of 
communications that encourages sea borne trade and transport of energy products. Any 
disruption in traffic flow, and particularly the flow of energy products, poses serious 
security concerns for the littoral states since most of their energy lifelines are sea-based. 
Furthermore, given India, China and Japan's increasing energy demands, these countries 
are inevitably sensitive to the security of the region’s SLOC and choke points.  
Unfortunately, like the Persian Gulf and GoG, the Indian Ocean has been 
bedeviled with increasing rate of piracy, terrorism, the terror-crime nexus, gunrunning, 
maritime pollution, and oil-related and environmental disasters. Despite maritime 
bonding, for decades there has been no vibrant trans-oceanic community in the region.15 
Analysts argue that this is rooted in the countries’ dissimilarities and divergent interests, 
prompting each to pursue economic linkages more with the West than with each other. 
The situation results in a lack of coherent maritime security strategy that limits the 
region's ability to counter security threats.  
The convergence of interests on security issues cannot be attained because of the 
states' dissimilarities in military and economic capabilities. The good news, however, is 
that recently the Indian Ocean states overcame their historical mistrust enough to engage 
in basic maritime cooperation.16 The approach is that each littoral state adopts individual 
                                                 
14 P. K. Ghosh, “Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia and the India Ocean: Response 
Strategies,” American-Pacific Sea Lanes Security Institute Conference on Maritime Security in Asia, 
Honolulu, Hawaii. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 18-20 January 2004, 2. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” Naval 
War College Review Vol. 61, No. 1 (2008):87. 
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security measures and in most cases cooperates bilaterally. However, despite the need for 
such responses due to transnational threats, effective multilateral approaches are still 
limited. Even the charter forming the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional 
Cooperation (IORARC) ignores the issue of collective maritime security.17 Similarly, the 
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), proposed by the U.S. was strongly 
criticized when the media incorrectly reported that the high-speed vessels would conduct 
antiterrorist patrols in the Strait of Malacca. In the meantime, the navies of India, 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa operate at individual, 
bilateral, and in some cases multilateral levels to stem the security threats. These efforts 
are yielding positive results, checking maritime security threats even as the multilateral 
approach takes root in the region. 
6. ECOWAS Past Collective Security Effort 
This thesis relies upon analysis of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean security 
experiences, in addition to those of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG (Economic Community 
of West African States Monitoring Group) peace support operations (PSO) in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau.  
The ECOMOG intervention established a precedent as the first sub-regional 
military force to take such a mission in the third world since the end of the Cold War and 
as the first sub-regional military force working as a secondary partner with the UN.18 
Thus ECOMOG, despite sub-regional and bilateral differences, succeeded in bringing 
peace to the aforementioned countries. This was due to political acceptance among the 
combatants, knowledge of the contested nations’ political issues and physical geography, 
commitment to ending a nearby struggle that could affect neighboring states, appropriate 
military capabilities and cooperation.19  
Nigeria must again seek the cooperation of GoG member states in implementing 
the proposed integrated collective maritime security strategy to stem emerging maritime 
                                                 
17 Joshua Ho, “The Security of Regional Sea Lanes,” Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 
Singapore, June 2005, No. 81: 20.  
18 Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping,” International 
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996-1997): 145-176.  
19 Ibid. 
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security challenges. The strategy will demonstrate to the extra-regional stakeholders the 
ability of the sub-region to secure the maritime environment, which will in turn reduce 
the likelihood of external involvement. Like the Indian Ocean strategy, this study 
considers a layered strategy made up of individual, bilateral, and multilateral approaches 
to securing GoG maritime environment.  
B. CONCEPTS USED IN THE STUDY 
Concepts used in the thesis include interest, security, sea power, strategy, defense 
policy, maritime domain awareness, and navies world wide. Relationships among these 
variables and gaps in existing literature about them are equally examined. 
1. Interest 
An interest could be described as likeness, admiration or feeling for something 
that seems necessary or important to an individual, family, group of people or a nation. 
This study considers interests that are beneficial, whether internal or external. Internal 
interests are those which belong to an individual, group or a nation; the party in question 
has exclusive rights over it. External interests are those for which the interested party 
does not have exclusive rights over the object. In this thesis, external interests refer to 
extra-regional powers and oil majors with interests in the GoG sub-regional oil and other 
natural resources. 
The U.S., some European countries, China, India, and Japan are extra-regional 
nations interested in the GoG sub-region. There is now international competition among 
these nations for dominance in the GoG sub-region. The primary object of their interest is 
oil and other natural resources. Their interest is due partly to increasing instability in 
traditional energy suppliers like the Persian Gulf, the better quality of oil in GoG sub-
region, and the GoG's strategic position since it does not have numerous transit choke 
points.20 The sub-region is considered a vital artery to sub-regional seaborne trade, 
serving as the main shipping transit route to the Atlantic corridor.21 For Nigeria, the GoG 
constitutes its most strategic environment and security interests.  
                                                 
20 F. Agwu, “Foreign Interest in the Gulf of Guinea: Implications for National Security,” unpublished 




Security for a nation is its ability to feel secured against threats that could 
undermine its stability or threaten its survival.22 It is the basic requirement for survival as 
an independent nation-state in international politics. During the nuclear age, security 
policies focused on the physical survival of the state.23 It was assumed that security 
policies were anchored in rational assessments by knowledgeable analysts and that 
clearly defined threats could be identified and appropriate strategies developed to counter 
them. 
In conventional security thinking, a state’s military power is measured against the 
power of other nation-states. The net assessment helps to determine the minimum 
military power a nation-state needs to deter a hostile attack, or at least to defend itself 
(second strike capability). Nation-states with enough resources focus on measures to 
attain a military balance of power with their rivals. Factors like force, cohesive power and 
inter-state conflicts are cornerstones of security analyses of the superpower nuclear 
rivalry during the Cold War era. 
In contrast, in the Western academic community, the post-Cold War research 
agenda for regional security in Africa emphasizes multi-dimensional threats, including a 
broad spectrum of vital interests. These vital interests include the organic survival of the 
national population, the protection of state sovereignty, the well-being of citizens and 
political status and prestige. Contrasting the conventional security view, the nature and 
type of threats in this expanded concept of security are much more complex. The 
complexities are specifically due to dynamic causal links among four major dimensions 
of security: military, economic, ecological and ethnic.24 
African states need determine how to deal with both internal security threats from 
political separatists and traditional external security threats. However, political 
                                                 
22 Ciro E. Zoppo, “The Issues of Nordic Security: The Dynamics of East-West Politics in Emerging 
Technologies, and the Definition of National Defense” in Nordic Security at the Turn of the Twenty-First 
Century, Center for International and Strategic Affairs (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 29. 
23 Mark W. Zacher, “The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International 
Order and Governance,” in James F. Rosenau and Ernst Czempedi (eds.) Government without Government: 
Order and Change in World Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 139. 
24 Ganiyu T. A. Adekeye, “The Nigerian Navy in National Defense,” lecture delivered at the Nigerian 
National War College, January 2006), 18. 
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separatism is more of a political and social problem than a military-strategic one. Thus, 
African security in this thesis refers to the ability of an African state to counter all threats 
to its survival, ranging from external aggression to threats of economic, political, social 
and cultural insecurities, while simultaneously grappling with the challenges of nation-
building and good governance. 
3. Sea Power 
Sea power encompasses the control of international maritime trade, the operation 
of navies in war, and the use of navies to achieve political influence during peacetime.25 
Naval strategists like Alfred Mahan identify six principal factors affecting the sea power 
of nations: geographical position, natural resources and climate, the extent of territory, 
population, the character of the people, and government policy.26 Julian Corbett updates 
Mahan’s list to include economic strength, technological development, and dependency 
on maritime trade. He observes that these characteristics determine the ability of nation-
states to develop and successfully employ sea power.27  Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 
defines sea power as a nation-state's use of naval forces to send armies and commerce to 
its allies across seas and oceans, and to territories where access is needed for war (sea 
control) and to prevent enemies from doing the same (sea denial).28 
The concept of sea power is applicable to the security concerns of a globalizing 
world economy. The ultimate goal of sea power is unrestricted access to the world’s 
common transportation routes, as well as access to markets and materials. Ensuring good 
order (safe and unrestricted access) to the GoG sub-region is the cardinal objective of this 
thesis. Good order requires a naval presence (see Figure 1).  Naval presence encourages 
stability and security and sets the stage for diplomatic and political cooperation. 
Achievement of sea control and sea denial requires a well funded, structured and efficient 
navy. 
                                                 
25 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1990), 232. 
26 James Wirtz, et al., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 119. 
27 Michael McGwire, Maritime Strategy and the Sea Powers (London: Adelphi Papers IISS, 1976), 
15. 
28 O. O. Biobaku, Maritime Strategy and Strategy, lecture delivered at the Nigerian National War 
College, October 2005, 18. 
 11 
 
Good Order  







Oil & Gas 
Fisheries 













Means/Uses Interest/Object Threats 
 
Figure 1.   Good Order at Sea.29  
4. Navies Worldwide 
Navies are policy instruments of statecraft as the maritime component of a nation-
state’s defense forces. Naval strategists observe that a key reason to establish navies is to 
protect maritime sea lane of communications.30 Accordingly, navies have been variously 
classified. For example, A. T. Morris classifies navies in a hierarchy of expansion based 
upon their initial weaponry, modernity and weapons equipment, supplementary naval 
power and corroborating national power base. Considering these factors, he classifies 
navies of the world into nine categories including Major Global Force Projection  
 
 
                                                 
29 Alan Lee Boyer, “Naval Response to a Changed Security Environment: Maritime Security in the 
Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review Vol. 60 No. 3 (Summer 2007). 
30 Adekeye, 18. 
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(Complete), Major Global Force Projection (Partial), Medium Global Force Projection, 
Medium Regional Force Projection, Adjacent Force Projection, Offshore Territorial 
Defense, Inshore Territorial Defense, Constabulary and Token Navies.31 
In this categorization scheme, the U.S. Navy is the only complete major force 
projection navy. The Nigerian Navy is in the sixth category as an offshore territorial 
defense navy, while the navies of member states of GoG are placed lower, as 
constabulary and token navies. Booth further classifies navies based on perceived roles 
and geographical ranging. While the roles of navies consist of policing, diplomatic and 
military functions, classification is based on geographical ranges (Global, Ocean Going, 
Contiguous, Seas and Coastal Sea).32 This further categorization groups the NN among 
the coastal sea navies. 
5. Relationships Among the Concepts 
International competition for dominance in the GoG maritime domain can be seen 
as a security threat. Increased activities open the door to both internal and external 
threats. National security calls for a clear appreciation and use of sea power. Ensuring sea 
control and sea denial and protecting a nation’s vital economic and political interests are 
core functions of the navy. Consequently, a littoral state must structure and organize its 
navy to meet its responsibility to contribute to national security and nation-building.  
The GoG sub-regional offshore oil and gas resources are vital economic interests. 
Therefore, events within the GoG are of great concern to all member states of the GoG 
sub-region and to Nigeria in particular. The NN has a responsibility to ensure that the 
maritime environment where assets are located is effectively and efficiently monitored 
and protected.  
Most of the GoG navies have limited capacity for force projection, sea control and 
sea denial outside their nation’s territorial waters. However, the NN is a notch above 
most of the navies of the GoG sub-region. It therefore behooves on the NN to pursue and  
 
                                                  
31 Michael A. Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies (London: Macmillan, 1988), 25. 
32 Ibid. 
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implement policies to guarantee collaboration and cooperation to protect maritime 
environment. Such cooperation requires sub-regional nations to pool their resources to 
protect the economic resources of the sub-region.  
6. Absence of Literature  
In the course of this study, it became clear that very little literature is available on 
the GoG maritime security environment. Similarly, there was very little academic or 
policy interest in the GoG sub-region until the recent crisis in the Middle East. The recent 
upsurge of oil exploration activities within the sub-region has resulted in greater 
awareness and led to the publication of a few scholarly works. However, the few 
available sources focus more on economic issues, with little or no attention on their 
protection. The most significant publication is by Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates 
in 2004; it deals extensively with the economic potential of the sub-region.33 
Unfortunately, their work does not propose strategies for countering emerging security 
threats.  
This study seeks to address the existing gap in knowledge. The result of the 
thesis's primary and secondary information is an integrated collective maritime security 
strategy using the framework of ends, ways, and means.34  
C. LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
Reports, seminar papers, treaty documents, executive summaries and memoranda 
concerning the GoG sub-region and case studies from regions with similar problems are 
used to develop the proposed strategy. However, there is a dearth of published works on 
the sub-region's maritime activities, and in addition, there is not adequate current 
statistical data on some sub-region navies. The thesis research is limited to the 
development of maritime security strategy.  
                                                 
33 Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, 
Economic Growth, Social Development, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War 
College, 2004.  
34 Joseph R. Ceremi and James F. Holcomb Jr., “U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy,” Article 
online; available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/00354.pdf, Internet: accessed 17 August 
2007. 
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The thesis assumes that oil and natural gas in the GoG sub-region will remain a 
major source of energy supply to the global energy market in the foreseeable future. If 
this assumption is true, it will help give stakeholders and external actors the political will 
and economic means to make the strategy a reality. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized into three chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter II examines the security environment of the sub-region.  Chapter III develops 
proposed strategy to counter the emerging security challenges in the GoG sub-region.  
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II. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE SUB-REGION 
A. GEO-STRATEGIC SETTING 
For the purposes of this thesis, the GoG sub-region is defined as the thirteen West 
African nations mostly fronting the Atlantic Ocean from Angola in the Southeast to Cote 
d’ Ivoire in the West. Other countries within this area include Ghana, Togo, the Republic 
of Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe. Chad is the only landlocked 
country among the GoG states. These countries have different colonial ties. The 
languages spoken across the sub-region include English, French, Portuguese and 
Spanish.35 The sub-region population is estimated at over 200 million. Nigeria alone has 
about 140 million, with over 250 ethnic groups and a land mass of about 350,000 square 
miles.36 Nigeria is thus a dominant nation in the sub-region in terms of human and 
material resources. 
The sub-region has a coastline of about 3,400 miles (5,500 km), roughly the size 
of Mexico (Figure 2).37 With an EEZ of 200 nautical miles, the sub-region has a maritime 
domain of about 680,000 square nautical miles (nm). Exercising effective and sustained 
security over this vast maritime domain is a daunting challenge for sub-regional states.  
                                                 
35 Damian Ondo Mane, “Emergence of the Gulf of Guinea in the Global Economy: Prospects and 
Challenges,” IMF Working Paper, Article online; available from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05235.pdf, Internet: accessed 27 December 2007. 
36 “Nigeria: Facts and Figures,” Article online; available from 
http://encarta.msn.com/fact_631504831/Nigeria_Facts_and_Figures.html, Internet: accessed 27 December 
2007. 
37 Raymond Gilpin, “Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, 
No. 1 (2007). 
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Figure 2.   Political Map of Africa Showing Gulf of Guinea Sub-Region38 
 
                                                 
38 Luventicus Modified, Online: http://www.luventicus.org/maps/africa/gulfofguinea.html, Internet:  
Accessed 30 April 2008. 
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B. NATURAL RESOURCES 
The sub-region is endowed with numerous living and nonliving resources 
including diamonds, gold, huge deposits of hydrocarbon, manganese nodules, nickel and 
fish.  Geologists estimate that the oil, gas and deepwater reserves within the sub-region 
are about 77.4 million barrels, 11.8 trillion cubic meters and more than 14 billion barrels 
(Tables 1and 2). The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates 
the sub-regional total oil reserves to be in the neighborhood of 80 billion barrels, about 
eight percent of the world’s crude oil reserves.39 Additionally, within the sub-region an 
estimated one million metric tons of fish are caught annually, of which more than one-
third for export.40 
 
Country/Region Onshore Oil 
(million) 
Gas (Trillion Cubic 
meters) 
1. Middle East 685.6 56.0 
2. North America 37.3 7.1 




4. Asia-Pacific 38.7 12.6 
5. Africa 77.4 11.8 
6. Europe 19.7 61.0 
7. Former Soviet Union 77.8  






                                                 
39 Jean-Christopher Servant, “The New Gulf Oil States,” Article online; available from 
http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil, Internet: accessed 1 February 2008. 
40 Food and Agricultural Organization Annual Report 2006, United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization. 
41 BP 2003 Statistical Review of World Economy in Jean-Christopher Servant, “The New Gulf Oil 
States,” Article online; available from http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil, Internet: accessed 1 February 
2008. 
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Country/Region Deep Water Oil
      1.  West Africa 14.495 
2.  Gulf of Mexico 12.393 
3. Northwest Europe 3.126 
4. Mediterranean Sea 1.868 
5. Brazil 8.396 
6. Asia-Pacific 2.139 
Table 2.   Deep Water Reserves 200342  
Analysts and representatives of oil majors agree in their predictions that 
production will rapidly increase in the coming decades. As noted in Table 3, the oil 
output figures of the major oil producing countries like Nigeria and Angola are expected 











                                                 
42 Douglas-Westwood/Infield Systems’ world in Jean-Christopher Servant, “The New Gulf Oil 
States,” Article online; available from http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil, Internet: accessed 1 February 
2008. 
43 Lutz Neumann, “European Policy and Energy Interests: Challenges from the Gulf of Guinea, Oil 
Policy,” in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, 
Economic Growth, Social Development. International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War 
College, 2004, 59-67.  
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S/No 2005 2010 2015 2030 
1. Nigeria 2,719,000 3,042,000 3,729,000 4,422,000 
2. Equatorial Guinea    313,000    466,000    653,000    724,000 
3. Angola 1,098,000 2,026,000 2,549,000 3,288,000 
4. Congo (Brazzaville)    285,000    300,000    314,000    327,000 
5. Gabon    303,000    291,000    279,000    269,000 
6. Cote d’ Ivoire      43,000      71,000      83,000      94,000 
7. Cameroon      84,000      72,000      66,000      61,000 
8. DR Congo (Kinshasa)      30,000      33,000      30,000      25,000 
9. Ghana      11,000      16,000      20,000      23,000 
10. Total 9,936,000 12,059,000 13,975,000 16,242,000
Table 3.   Projected Oil Production of Gulf of Guinea in Barrels per Day (2005-
2030)44 
Other natural resources that increase the sub-region's strategic importance include 
cobalt, copper, uranium, cocoa, coffee, oil palm fruits, and columbite tantalite (a key raw 
material used in cellular phones, satellites, and telecommunications equipment). The 
Congo Basin has the world’s second largest rain forest and is also home to one of the 
world’s most powerful rivers, the Congo River. The Congo River power plant provides 
electricity to countries as far away as Egypt and South Africa.45 All these resources put 
the sub-region in a high strategic position among global sub-regions. 
C. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SUB-REGION 
The global economy is experiencing tremendous changes with significant effects 
anticipated on the GoG sub-region. The political climate in the Middle East, which has 
disruptive effects on oil prices and causes shifts in the structure of oil demand, coupled 
with robust economic growth in China and India, is likely to elevate the sub-region in 
U.S., European, and Asian energy strategies.  
                                                 
44 EIA, U.S. Department of Energy (2004) in Lutz Neumann, “European Policy and Energy Interests: 
Challenges from the Gulf of Guinea, Oil Policy,” in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in 
the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development. International 
Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 59-67. 
45 Mane, 5. 
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Other factors fuel interests in the GoG sub-region. Most sub-regional oil is 
exploited from offshore oil fields, far from ground-based political instability, and can be 
easily protected from domestic disorder. Problems linked to Caspian Sea oil exploration 
and exploitation, and especially ecological problems, make the GoG off-shore oil even 
more appealing. With the exception of Chad, whose oil fields are connected to Cameroon 
by the 1,000 kilometer long Doba-Kribi pipeline, no oil routes in the sub-region pass 
through the territories of neighboring countries.46  Therefore, oil deals can be made 
bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Additionally, the sub-region's crude oil is better 
quality than that from Latin America,47 and the oil contains little sulfur, which better 
suits U.S. oil companies. Finally, the numerous transit chokepoints facing other world oil 
producing nations adds to the comparative advantage of producers in the sub-region, 
contributing to ease of shipping, lower transportation costs, and fewer environmental 
hazards and security problems.  
Overall, GoG oil is an attractive source of energy. It leads all other regions in 
proven deepwater oil reserves (about 14,495 billion barrels), which will create significant 
savings in security budgetary provisions. This, according to experts, has prompted the 
U.S. Intelligence Estimate to anticipate an increase in its GoG oil imports from the 
current 16 percent to 25 percent by the year 2015 (a percentage higher than U.S. imports 
from the Middle East).48 While some analysts believe that the sub-region and even Africa 
as a whole do not measure up to the Middle East, there is a general consensus within the 
U.S. energy community that it could be a viable alternative. Within the next decade, oil 
production in the sub-region could double from its present four to eight million barrels 
per day (bpd), an amount that corresponds roughly to the anticipated growth in U.S. oil 
imports within the same period.49 The sub-region is the only oil producing regions of the  
 
 
                                                 
46 Mane. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Rudolf Traub-Merz, “The Geo-Strategic Importance of the Gulf of Guinea,” in Rudolf Traub-Merz 
and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social 
Development, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 9-26. 
49 Traub-Merz. 
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world not yet dependent on any single regional client. The competitiveness of other extra-
regional powers notwithstanding, the sub-region may become an area that produces oil 
essentially for American energy consumers. 
Oil and natural gas exploitation normally go together. Liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) is the preferred fuel in most developed countries because it burns cleaner than oil 
and is relatively cheap. Consumption of LNG has increased to 25 percent from just 19 
percent a few years ago.50 Unfortunately, within the sub-region gas is still treated as a by-
product of oil exploitation and is generally flared and burned off. However, the 
government has directed oil companies operating in Nigeria to end gas flaring and 
convert it for commercial use by 2010.  
Africa and the Asia Pacific each account for eight percent of the world’s proven 
reserves of natural gas. (Figure 3) Up to one quarter of Africa’s gas reserves is located in 
the GoG sub-region. Nigeria is the leading gas producer and holds the largest gas 
reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also an important exporter of liquefied natural gas.51 
Other countries in the sub-region with gas reserves include Cameroon, the DR Congo, 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea. The strategic importance of the sub-region has made it the 
toast of many stakeholders and the international competition for these resources has made 
the issue of collective security an imperative. 
                                                 
50 Johannes Dieterich, “The Gulf of Guinea and the Global Oil Market: Supply and Demand,” in 
Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic 
Growth, Social Development, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 
28-37. 
51 Mane, 6.  
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Figure 3.   Share of World’s Proven Gas Reserve (2002)52 
D. STAKEHOLDERS  
1. States of the Sub-Region 
The strategic importance of the GoG sub-region in terms of its resource 
endowment and as a shipping route and hub has drawn both domestic and international 
attention to the area. The number of oil exporting countries in the sub-region will likely 
increase in the near future, from the present six to ten or eleven. Presently, there are more 
well-endowed countries (like Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Angola, and DR 
Congo) and the less well-endowed (like Togo). Among the well-endowed states shown in 
Table 4, Equatorial Guinea generated 86 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) 
from 90 percent of its oil exports in 2002, while Gabon within the same period generated 
73 percent of its GDP from 81 percent of its oil exports. Nigeria, Angola, and DR Congo 
within the same period had government revenues of 83 percent, 90 percent, and 80 
percent, generated 95 percent, 90 percent, and 94 percent from their oil exports.  
 
                                                 
52 Oil & Gas Journal, December 23, 2002 in Johannes Dieterich, “The Gulf of Guinea and the Global 
Oil Market: Supply and Demand,” in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of 
Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development, International Conference 
Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 28-37. 
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S/No Country GDP Revenue Exports 
1. Equatorial Guinea 86% 61% 90% 
2. Gabon 73% 60% 81% 
3. Angola 45% 90% 90% 
4. Congo 67% 80% 94% 
5. Nigeria 40% 83% 95% 
6. Cameroon 4.9% 20% 60% 
Table 4.   Measures of Oil Dependency, National Income, Government Revenue and 
Export53 
The international competition for dominance in the GoG maritime domain can be 
seen as a security threat. Attempts by extra-regional powers to influence their former 
colonies for access to oil now pit member states against each other. A typical example is 
the maritime boundary dispute, exacerbated by former colonial administrations, between 
Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Increased 
activities within the GoG sub-region have opened the door for both internal and external 
threats. Maritime boundary disputes, piracy, illegal oil bunkering, disruption of oil 
terminal and flow stations operations, poaching, terrorism and environmental degradation 
are now common problems. 
This thesis argues that member states of the sub-region need to set aside their 
differences and articulate a sub-regional oil policy as well as a common security strategy. 
A sub-regional oil policy would include the possibility of collective bargaining with 
extra-regional stakeholders, and would require absence of major conflict among the sub-
region states.54 Arguments against such a sub-regional policy include the chronic 
weakness of the sub-regional state institutions, under-developed economies, heavy 
foreign debts, poor social conditions and widespread poverty. Experts have expressed 
                                                 
53 Commission Économique pour l’Afrique Centrale, les Économies de l’Afrique central 2003 in 
Manuel Correia de Barros, “Can the Gulf of Guinea Develop a Common Regional Oil Policy,” in Rudolf 
Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, 
Social Development, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 68-71. 
54 Manuel Correia de Barros, “Can the Gulf of Guinea Develop a Common Regional Oil Policy,” in 
Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic 
Growth, Social Development, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 
68-71. 
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concern that these problems will undermine member nations' ability to negotiate better 
bargains with their resources. Also, the projected emergence of new, cheaper, cleaner, 
and more accessible sources of energy may put an end to the monopoly currently enjoyed 
by oil as the world’s premier energy source. Arguments against a sub-regional oil policy 
notwithstanding, most of these countries depend heavily on oil and other resources for 
their GDP, revenue and exports. Member states of the sub-region cannot continue to pay 
only lip service to cooperating with a collective maritime strategy. They need to nurture a 
stable polity and make the GoG maritime domain an investor-friendly environment. 
2. Competition for Gulf of Guinea Oil 
Historically, the British firms Shell and British Petroleum (BP) dominated the 
development of oil in Nigeria. Their initial monopolistic position was lost with the 
entrance of other multinational corporations like Mobil Exploration Nigeria, Gulf Oil 
Nigeria, the Italian State firm ENI (AGIP), Total Elf, ChevronTexaco and the French 
subsidiary SAFRAP. French Equatorial Africa had French firms (SPAEF). In Portuguese 
Angola and Belgian Congo, the dominant oil firm was the American Cabinda Gulf Oil 
Company. Angola today is dominated by oil majors like ChevronTexaco, Total, and 
ExxonMobil.  American oil companies ExxonMobil, Ocean, Marathon, and Amerada 
Hess dominated Spanish Guinea.55   
Today, the scramble for African oil, including GoG oil, has changed from a 
political contest among European national oil companies monopolizing their neo-colonial 
spheres of influence to an economic contest among multinational and national oil 
companies. All are bidding for oil concessions across old imperial boundaries. The 
changed economic contest caused by oil majors trying to break the monopolies held by 
the dominant firms opens the door to maritime security threats in the sub-region. For 
example, environmental degradation from oil exploration and exploitation has not been 
given adequate attention. The communities whose livelihood is touched by environmental 
degradation persistently cry foul without favorable response. The failure of both the 
                                                 
55 Douglas A. Yates, “Changing Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment in Oil-Economies of the Gulf 
of Guinea,” in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and 
Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development,  International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National 
War College, 2004, 38-50. 
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government and the oil majors to respond has provided the expanded political 
opportunities for militant youth to emerge in the Niger Delta; today these militant youth 
are causing havoc in the oil rich Niger Delta area.56  
The shift from political to economic contests reflects three major transformations 
in the international system: the change from a multi-polar to a uni-polar order, the 
privatization and multinational mergers of former national oil companies, and the failure 
of African states to successfully nationalize their petroleum industries.57 The gradual 
decline of British, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Belgian spheres of influence over the 
course of the 20th century was paralleled by the rise of American capitalism to global 
hegemony. 
a. European Union (EU) 
It has been argued that energy is crucial for the economic welfare, social 
stability and geographical security of every nation-state. This effect is amplified with 
growing competition for access to limited energy resources. The EU countries are no 
exception.  
For the past several decades, energy policy in the EU was regarded as an 
affair of economic state administration and private companies. This perception changed 
with the oil crises of 1973-74, when international demand started to exceed supply and 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed a fourfold increase of 
crude oil prices to almost $12 per barrel.58 The cost increases contributed to severe 
economic crisis in Europe, with high inflation and high unemployment. The Arab oil 
embargo of the 1970s further made clear the need for more collaboration on energy 
policies among the nations of Europe and between Europe and energy producers of the 
world. Unfortunately, every country adopted a separate strategy to cope with the crisis,  
 
                                                 
56 Chuks Iheme, “Ijaw Youths Militant Collective Action: How Rational,” Unpublished Defense 
Analysis Course 3721 Paper, (NPS Monterey: Winter 2008), 1-20. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Aglika Ganova, “European Union Energy Supply Policy: Diversified in Unity,” Article online; 
available from http://www.iehei.org/bibliotheque/memoires/MemoireGANOVA.pdf, Internet: accessed 5 
February 2008. 
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ranging from boosting domestic oil and gas production to building nuclear plants. Each 
nation's strategy depended on its geographic interests, domestic resources and production, 
specific needs and diplomatic relations with suppliers and transit countries. 
Satisfying oil security drove most nations of the EU back to their former 
colonies. As there are no political restrictions, European countries can buy oil from 
former colonies or elsewhere. In 2000, the EU Commission observed in a published 
Green Paper that Europe’s oil dependency is high and will continue to rise in conjunction 
with declining North Sea supplies. The paper observed that if this trend continues, in the 
next two decades oil exports to Europe from the GoG sub-region will rise from 50 
percent to about 70 percent.59  
Today, the largest EU-based oil companies operating in the GoG are Shell, 
BP, Total and Agip. In Nigeria, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) 
accounts for roughly half of Nigeria’s oil production.60 Shell is the major stakeholder in 
the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) joint venture and other Shell subsidiaries 
such as Shell Nigeria Gas (SNG) and the Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production 
Company Limited (SNEPCO); together these made Shell the largest oil and gas company 
in Nigeria.  
European Union relations with the GoG sub-region are focused mainly on 
development cooperation with ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS). Such relationships focus on peace, security and good 
governance, with a strong emphasis on economic and trade integration.61 The ECCAS is 
much less developed than the ECOWAS, but the EU is bolstering its capacity to perform 
a role similar to that of ECOWAS, in line with the African Union (AU) economic, 
political, and security programs. 
 
                                                 
59 Neumann, 59-67. 
60 Ibid. 
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 27 
b. The United States 
There has been an increased global strategic interest in the GoG since the 
end of the 1990s and especially since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the 
United States. Central to global interest in the region is the rising profile of the GoG in 
the West’s energy security calculations, as a source of both oil and profit for western oil 
majors.62 Furthermore, interest in the GoG is shaped by turbulent relations between the 
U.S. and President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela that have affected the oil supply from 
Venezuela. The continued instability in the Persian Gulf region, which is among the 
major crude oil suppliers to the U.S., has a similar result. These factors greatly influence 
U.S. policy towards Africa and the GoG sub-region. Since diversification of energy 
supplies is now the cornerstone of U.S. energy security policy, Washington sees GoG oil 
as a crucial opportunity to further diversify its oil supply, thus facilitating the inclusion of 
GoG in the strategic energy calculations of U.S. policymakers.63   
The new focus on the GoG is welcome, particularly among leading 
American policymakers and oil company executives who see prospects for maximizing 
gains while competing with Britain, France and China for oil in the GoG. For example, 
Walter Kansteiner, former U.S. Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, notes that 
African oil has become a U.S. national strategic interest. Ed Royce, a Republican 
Congressman from California and former Chairman of the African Congressional 
Subcommittee, advised after the tragic events of September 11 that African oil should 
become a priority for U.S. national security.64 The National Intelligence Council 
forecasts that the U.S. could be importing as much as 25 percent of its oil from West 
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invests more than $10 billion in African oil industry annually. It is estimated that three-
quarters of U.S. foreign direct investment in Africa in the next decade will be in the 
energy sector.66 
United States' policy and energy interests in the GoG sub-region involves 
partnering with member states to create an investor friendly environment. These 
partnerships require political stability, rule of law and property rights. The U.S. sees 
accountability in managing oil revenues as an important step in promoting the socio-
political environment. With increased focus on the GoG comes with increased security 
threats and risks stemming from corruption and bad governance, piracy, terrorism, 
militant activities, oil flow station and terminal operation disruptions, maritime boundary 
disputes and oil majors’ competition for dominance. These new threats to oil supply 
security require new U.S. policy approaches to energy security, so U.S. energy policy 
endorses stronger global alliances, such as bilateral relationships with key countries and 
regions.67 
The U.S. has expanded military aid programs in Africa, including the 
provision of arms, military equipment and technical assistance. Expanded aid programs 
are intended to enhance friendly African states' internal security so they can better control 
ethnic, religious, and factional divisions, support peacekeeping operations, and improve 
anti-terrorism measures.68 Other measures that the U.S. is using to complement maritime 
security include military training, U.S. Navy exercises, the acquisition of basing rights in 
strategic African countries and the establishment of U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) 
as a new geographic combatant command responsible for the African region. 
c. China 
China’s recent emergence as a major player in the oil market has created 
shockwaves in international markets for oil and other raw materials. Its sudden rise to 
become the world’s second largest oil consumer and third largest oil importer should 
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come as no surprise, given its economic growth rate. China’s rapid rise as a consumer in 
the global oil market is a concern because its difficulties in breaking into already 
established markets to source these products. Added to this problem is the associated 
regionalization of the market and investments in oilfield development.  
Four factors lie behind the regionalization of the oil market: the length of 
transport routes, existing transport infrastructure, the market coordinates of the 
companies involved in exploitation, and traditional business relationships.69 It is not easy 
for newcomers like China to break into established market structures. For China, the 
available options are paying more than market price for oil, overbidding for exploration 
rights, and political maneuvering. Of course, China makes more extensive use of these 
options than any other country, and they are not welcomed with open arms by the 
established players.  
As part of the political maneuvering, Chinese Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing spent a week in January 2006 visiting four African states, including Nigeria.70 
The trip involved a series of diplomatic exchanges and more than one hundred meetings 
between high-ranking Chinese government officials and African politicians and business 
executives. It culminated in an invitation to 48 African heads of governments to visit 
China in November 2006 for a summit.71  
Chinese interests in the sub-region fall into three categories: diplomacy 
and foreign policy, economic and trade policy, and development policy and debt relief. 
China defends its economic interests anywhere in the world and particularly in the sub-
region. Its economy is characterized by a strong orientation towards foreign trade focused 
on continued increase in exports of goods and, in return, immense demand for raw 
materials. Chinese imports from the sub-region are mainly raw materials, particularly oil. 
With a share of about 30 percent, the sub-region already makes a considerable 
contribution to Chinese oil imports.72 In return, Chinese oil corporations (China National 
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Petroleum Corporations) have made extensive investments in Angola and Nigeria. 
Investments in Nigeria include the rehabilitation and expansion of Nigeria’s light 
weapons industry, oil refinery construction, power plants, and the possible rehabilitation 
of Nigeria’s rail system.73 China maintains a hands-off policy in the sub-region whereby 
all Chinese aid comes free of economic and political conditions.74 
In terms of security, China has a long history in Africa, having provided 
weapons to African groups pursing independence since the 1950s. China’s recent arms 
and equipment sales to the government in Khartoum and its refusal to press Khartoum to 
accept a U.N. peacekeeping mission led to accusations that China is fueling the current 
conflict in Sudan.75 Actions by Chinese policymakers such as the rehabilitation and 
expansion of Nigeria’s light weapons industry will undoubtedly pose serious challenges 
to other extra-regional powers’ interests in the GoG sub-region.  
E. THREAT ANALYSIS 
There is growing concern that the vast resources and potential in the GoG sub-
region are undermined by multifaceted domestic, sub-regional and international threats 
and vulnerabilities. It appears that rather than contributing to member states' stability and 
economic prosperity, the resources are almost a curse.76 Resource abundant economies 
have not had appreciable growth rate, but rather the reverse. None of the sub-region 
countries has experienced rapid economic growth since oil and other resources were 
discovered. Analysts attribute this to political and socioeconomic problems including bad 
governance, corruption, lack of economic diversity, militants youth activities, piracy, 
poaching and terrorism. The pervasive insecurity tends to make the sub-region look like 
an investor unfriendly environment, which in turn leads to huge financial losses. Experts 
believe this contributes significantly to the sub-region's constrained investment and 
economic prospects.77  
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1. Domestic and Sub-regional Security Challenges 
Poor governance is a common problem across the resource-laden sub-region. 
Although states of the sub-region differ in many ways, they share several characteristics. 
All are post-colonial states with weak governments, underdeveloped economies and 
inadequate qualified human capital. Citizens suffer from poverty, hunger, illiteracy, 
unemployment and low life expectancy.78 Very few of the states achieve significant 
growth, and none can boast an equitable income distribution. A related vulnerability 
stems from most member states’ weak internal security forces—forces that are under-
trained, poorly equipped and incapable of effectively policing their internal waters and 
maritime boundaries. 
These negative influences lead to increases in maritime boundary disputes, piracy, 
illegal bunkering, disruption of oil terminals and flow stations operations, destruction of 
oil pipelines, poaching, terrorism, gun-running, and environmental degradation. 
Associated vulnerabilities include limited maritime domain awareness, weak 
infrastructure, and poor legislative and judicial arrangements. All these threats and 
vulnerabilities contribute to huge economic losses, the inability of member states to 
achieve millennium development goals, and shipping and trade losses.  
The inability of member states to mount collective, sustained and effective 
security control over the maritime domain makes it difficult for GoG states to enjoy the 
full benefits of the sub-regional EEZ's significant fishery resources. Recent studies 
suggest that poaching by vessels from Asia, Europe and other parts of Africa costs the 
sub-region some $370 million annually.79 In addition to the financial losses, poaching has 
human security costs. Households and individuals are affected directly by the reduced 
availability of seafood in local markets. Poaching also has a number of indirect effects, 
including drastic reduction of incomes and loss of livelihood in fishing communities.  
The rates of piracy and sea robbery have been increasing since the 1990s, 
occasioned by increasing shipping activities. The sub-region is ranked by the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) as one of the most troubled global waterways. 
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Despite debate about definitional issues and data reliability, there is broad consensus that 
criminal activity in this part of the continent is worrisome. An analysis of piracy attacks 
between 2002 and 2004 indicates that unlike most parts of the world, including elsewhere 
in Africa, the vast majority of attacks in the GoG resulted in an actual boarding.80 This 
reflects a heightened level of maritime insecurity. (See Figure 4.) 
 
 
Figure 4.   Piracy Attacks in Africa 2002-200481  
Activities of the Niger Delta militant youths further complicate the tenuous 
security climate. The activities of militants include disruption of oil terminals and flow 
stations operations, hostage taking of expatriate and national oil workers, illegal 
bunkering, terrorism, piracy and the destruction of oil installations. Experts say these 
highly organized criminal activities cost the sub-region around $1.2 billion annually in 
lost revenue.82 In addition, militants’ attempts to force the government to change its 
political, economic and social policies towards the Niger Delta area and criminal gangs' 
illegal bunkering add to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Recent 
evidence suggests that the weaponry is becoming more sophisticated and lethal as youth 
and criminal gangs try to evade national law enforcement agencies.  
It is often argued that enduring disagreements over maritime boundaries can 
escalate into armed conflict, particularly when the disputed areas have significant 
economic potential or are strategic transportation hubs. These disputes make it much 
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more difficult for sub-region countries to address shared security challenges in a 
collaborative manner. Examples of maritime disputes in the sub-region include those 
between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, between Equatorial Guinea 
and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River, and between Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon over the Mbane Island and Corisco Bay boundaries. 
Oil spills, pollution and environmental degradation are among the environmental 
hazards currently unchecked within the sub-region. In 2005, the Abuja Declaration 
reiterated issues highlighted in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) analysis, 
which indicated that fisheries mismanagement has led to stock depletion, ecological 
imbalance and environmental degradation. Unfortunately, less than 25 percent of the 
countries in this sub-region have ratified the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation.83 Although the petroleum industry is singled 
out as a major polluter in a lot of literature, improper domestic and industrial waste 
disposal also poses a significant threat. 
The traditional land-centric approach to security in the sub-region contributes to 
the neglect of maritime forces in both absolute and relative terms. It is not surprising that 
most countries cannot effectively monitor shipping traffic and activities within sub-
regional waters. There are no collective coastal radar stations for surveillance. According 
to data published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), patrol boats 
are grossly inadequate in the sub-region, with most listed assets categorized as non-
operational in Angola, Benin, and the DR Congo.84 In addition, most member states 
cannot police beyond their territorial waters. Poor maritime domain awareness 
undermines safety and security by allowing criminals to operate with impunity.  
Most countries in the sub-region are signatories to relevant international 
conventions. However, very few have taken concrete steps to ratify and institutionalize 
these protocols. Creating and enforcing the necessary provisions requires sustained 
political will and the enactment of enabling legislation. It further requires the 
strengthening of relevant institutions, the establishment of enforcement mechanisms, and 
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the allocation of adequate financial and human resources to maritime security and 
safety.85 It has been noted that even with appropriate laws in place; the ability to 
effectively enforce these laws depends on the strength and independence of the judiciary. 
Investigations reveal that corruption, inefficiency and capacity constraints compromise 
the effectiveness of the judicial system. Hence, offenders are often seen walking away.  
Most of the ports and infrastructure surveillance facilities in the sub-region are in 
dire need of repair, upgrades or replacement. Countries' failure to pay adequate attention 
to this crucial aspect of maritime security and safety over the years is partly responsible 
for the situation in which the area now finds itself. Most countries in the sub-region have 
yet to fully comply with standards for port safety and security outlined in the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, to which all maritime nations 
are signatories.86 In addition, an estimated 85 percent of vessels registered in GoG states 
are more than 20 years old, making them more susceptible to accidents.87 
F. CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY 
As noted above, the traditional land-centric approach to security contributes to the 
neglect of maritime forces. Added to this is the inability of sub-regional leaders to make 
collective maritime security strategy an important sub-regional policy focus. The 
situation contributes immensely to most GoG sub-region navies' inability to project 
forces and enforce sea control and denial outside their territorial waters. The 
individualistic approach against emerging security threats has not proved effective. A 
brief review of some of the sub-region's navies offers a clear view of the maritime 
security situation.  
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Nigeria is the only country in the sub-region with a navy that can boast of frigates, 
fast-attack crafts, landing ship tanks, air arm, river town class boats, in-shore patrol 
crafts, and tug boats in its inventory. Added to these are dockyard and shipyards facilities 
meant for second and third line maintenance of boats and ships.  
Nigeria articulates its Navy’s roles as the Trident Strategic concept.  The NN 
Trident Strategic Concept includes three levels contributing towards national military 
strategy (see Figure 5). The first level, coastal defense, protects the coastal approaches, 
territorial waters, and the EEZ. The second level is sub-regional sea control to defend 
Nigeria's maritime interests and support the national shipping policy by protecting sea-
lanes of communications (SLOC). The third level requires that the NN provide adequate 




Figure 5.   Nigeria Navy Trident Strategic Concept  
Like the Trident Strategic concept, the NN evolved its maritime mission in the 
form of defense-in-depth conceptualized as three concentric circles (see Figure 6). The 
inner and highest priority circle is coastal defense and inshore operations that include 
surveillance, early warning, anti-smuggling and piracy operations; protecting offshore oil 
installations; search and rescue (SAR); and policing seaward up to 100 nautical miles. 
The intermediate circle entails maintaining a naval presence in the EEZ for monitoring, 
policing, and sea control and to coordinate efforts against poaching, dumping of 
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hazardous materials and toxic waste, and in support of marine research. Finally, the outer 
ring involves surveillance, intelligence-gathering, training and flag-showing cruises, 
independent and joint exercises/operations, and allied or combined operations.88  
 
 
Figure 6.   Nigeria Navy Defense-in-Depth Concept 
Both concepts can guarantee adequate policing of the Nigerian maritime domain 
given the political will to fund the NN adequately. Adapting the same concepts within the 
sub-region will undoubtedly provide much-needed security. 
2. Côte d'Ivoire 
Côte d'Ivoire has a brown-water navy known as Marine Côte d'Ivoire. Its mission 
is essentially coastal surveillance and security for the nation's 281-mile coastline.89 It has 
two fast-attack craft, two patrol craft, and one light transport ship, as well as numerous 
smaller vessels used primarily for traffic, immigration, and contraband control.90 
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3. Ghana Navy  
The Ghana Navy was initially intended for coastal defense, fishery protection and 
internal security predominantly on Lake Volta. In 1994, the navy was reorganized into 
two commands, with the Eastern command headquartered at Tema, and the Western 
command at Sekondi. In 2007, the Ghana Navy included about 1214 personnel with four 
fast attack patrol boats as its capital ships.91 
Recently, the service hosted the USS Fort McHenry, USS Doyle, the South 
African frigate SAS Mendi, and USS Emory with its four patrol crafts in a maritime 
interdiction sea exercise off the coast of Takoradi as part of the African Partnership 
Station initiative aimed at helping African nations increase maritime security.92 The USS 
Doyle and other vessels from the U.S. European Command were deployed to Ghana to 
improve maritime security and safety in West and Central Africa and to help strengthen 
regional partnerships. 
4. Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) 
The DR Congo Navy is organized into four commands: Matadi (coastal), 
Kinshasa (riverine), Kalemi (Lake Tanganyika), and Goma (Lake Kivu).93 The navy has 
personnel strength of about 1,000 as of 2007, with eight patrol crafts. It also operates 
barges and small patrol crafts armed with machine guns. Experts describe the DR Congo 
marine forces as "in a state of near total disarray" and state that it neither conducts 
training nor has established standard operating procedures.94 
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5. Cameroonian Military 
Cameroon has marine forces known as gendarmerie. They have bases in 
Yaoundé, Douala, Limbe, and Kribi with gunboats designed for internal water, territorial 
and up to EEZ operations.95 Traditionally, Cameroon's military depend heavily on French 
defense capabilities to protect its major maritime security concerns. 
6. Military of Equatorial Guinea 
The Equatorial Guinea military was reorganized in 1979 giving birth to naval and 
gendarmerie forces to take care of the country's brown and internal waters security needs. 
The naval forces have about 200 service members; the strength of the gendarmerie is 
unknown.96  
In 1988, the United States donated a 68-foot patrol boat to the Navy for EEZ 
patrol. The U.S. military-to-military cooperation with the Equatorial naval forces has 
been dormant since 1997, the year of the last Joint Combined Exchange Training 
Exercise.97 The government recently acquired some Ukrainian patrol boats and helicopter 
gun ships. The Equatoguineans rely on foreigners to operate and maintain their 
equipment as they are not sufficiently trained.98 
7. Gulf of Guinea Commission 
The GoG Commission, a brainchild of Nigeria, was established to ensure peaceful 
exploration and exploitation of sub-regional resources among member states. The 
Commission, established by treaty, includes coastal states bordering the GoG from 
Nigeria to Angola including the island of Sao Tome and Principe. Its mandate is to 
promote peace and security as well as the economic, social, and environmental well-
being of its members. 
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The Commission is a major effort towards collective security which will reduce 
the likelihood of conflicts if concerted efforts are made to implement its mandate. 
Unfortunately, as of 2002, only Nigeria has ratified the Treaty. Similarly, it is on record 
that the technical sub-committee of the Commission has had several meetings resulting in 
the preparation of an action plan; however, neither the decisions of the sub-committee nor 
details of the plan are available for implementation.99  
8. Extra-Regional Powers 
Given the large expanse of water to be secured and the inability of most member 
states to police beyond their territorial waters, the U.S. and other extra-regional powers 
are making concerted efforts to protect the maritime domain. The U.S. is working 
through its European Command (USEUCOM), whose area of responsibility includes all 
American forces operating in Europe, Africa, and parts of Central Asia. The Command 
observes that its greatest challenge is the cooperation and willingness of member states to 
see maritime security as a sub-regional problem that needs a collective approach.100  
The Command strategy is based on higher guidance that recognizes the need to 
protect international maritime commerce that provides conveyance for over 80 percent of 
the world’s imports and exports. According to the strategy, the U.S., in cooperation with 
its allies, will lead an international effort to improve monitoring and enforcement 
capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels.101 
The former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs, Charles 
Snyder, notes that improving Africa's capacity to monitor its maritime domain is part of 
U.S. strategy. He calls for a revival of the old African coastal security program which 
once helped African security forces protect their shores and marine resources. The  
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program was revived by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, International 
Security Affairs Division in 1985, but the program was discontinued for lack of funds in 
1995.102 The program was of immense help while it lasted. 
Similar to the old African coastal security program, the 1000-ship Navy concept 
developed by Vice Admiral John Morgan (USN) and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio 
(USN) in 2005 seek cooperation of sub-regional naval forces to relieve pressure on U.S. 
military operations overextended by deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Partnership 
with the sub-regional forces would help member states combat a myriad of maritime 
security challenges. This concept ideally suits the asset limited sub-regional naval forces. 
As part of the partnership, U.S. naval forces visit sub-regional ports to discharge 
their peacetime diplomatic role. For example, in April 2006, the USS EMORY S. LAND 
visited Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Congo, and Angola. The visit included 
leadership development, natural disaster response, small boats drills, live fire exercises, 
amphibious raids, medical awareness and disease prevention. Similarly, USS GUNSTON 
HALL and USS SWIFT conducted sea exercises with some naval forces of the sub-
region in 2005.103 
In addition to maintaining limited presence in the GoG sub-region, the U.S. 
supports a number of initiatives to enhance internal security capabilities. The programs 
are designed to improve antiterrorism efforts, counterinsurgency, small unit maneuver, 
and light infantry operations easily deployed to suppress religious, ethnic and sectarian 
strife. Other measures to improve security include sale and transfer of arms, military 
training, and the acquisition of basing rights.104 Analysts argue that the sub-region's 
inability to safeguard the GoG sub-region led to American resolve to expand naval 
operations in Africa, resulting in the establishment of the African Regional Combatant 
Command (AFRICOM) in 2007.       
 
                                                 
102 Charles Snyder, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 13 April 2004.  
103 Rebekah Blowers, “Seabees Rebuild School, Makes Friends in Sao Tome,” Article online; 
available from http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=23186, Internet: accessed 13 April 
2008. 
104 Klare, 299. 
 41 
Just as the U.S. contributes to safeguarding the GoG maritime domain, so do 
France, UK (members of EU), and China. As noted above, the EU members support their 
former colonies with aid, military training, arms sales and transfer. China first became a 
major actor in the sub-region in the 1960s and 1970s when, in its ideological rivalry with 
the Soviet Union, it supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) movement, providing arms and military equipment to support the movement 
and after Angolan independence.105  
Finally, a number of conferences have been held to sensitize stakeholders to 
emerging security threats and the need for collective strategy. Spearheading these efforts 
is EUCOM, with conferences like the GoG Guard (GoG Maritime Security Conference) 
in October 2004. In July 2005, a conference on Gulf of Guinea Security was held in 
Washington, D.C., followed by another, in November 2006, on Maritime Safety and 
Security in Cotonou, Republic of Benin. The GoG Guard conference explored ways to 
assist member states in protecting natural resources and achieving long-term security and 
stability. The focus of such international conferences is to prevent sub-regional political, 
economic, and social issues from becoming regional stability problems that require 
international involvement.  
9. ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
When the Liberian crisis erupted in the late 1980s, the Economic Community for 
West African States, under Nigerian leadership, established the ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) as an interventionist group. Its intervention in the crisis on 25 August 
1990 marked an important turning point in the practice of peacekeeping by regional and 
sub-regional organizations.106 Its importance lies in the fact that it reignited an old debate 
within Africa about continental capacity to respond to challenges to peace and stability.  
The intervention was almost marred by the lack of clear cut guidelines, principles 
or rules of engagement for managing internal conflicts from the West African Heads of 
Government. The absence of guidelines affected both operational and tactical levels. 
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Among the reasons for the lack of clear cut guidelines were the differences in the 
interests of the contributing nations and disagreements on how the interventionist force 
should operate. 
These problems notwithstanding, ECOMOG provided an answer to those who 
wanted Africans to find solutions to their own problems. The UN, U.S., Britain, and 
France saw ECOMOG as a model to be replicated throughout Africa and other troubled 
regions of the world.107 This thesis believes that the spirit of ECOMOG can be reignited 
to create collective maritime security for the sub-region. With attention to lessons learned 
from the ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, collective maritime security in 
the GoG sub-region can be achieved.  
G. SUMMARY 
Most of the sub-regional countries cannot adequately secure their own brown and 
territorial waters. Securing their respective EEZ and beyond is another challenge entirely. 
Except for Nigeria and to a lesser extent Ghana, none have an articulated maritime 
defense strategy extending beyond territorial waters. Although Nigeria has a workable 
strategy, it also does not have the right mix of platforms to secure its roughly 84,000 
square nautical miles of maritime domain. But increasing security threats to the huge 
investments made by oil prospecting companies within the GoG sub-region are real. The 
time for the sub-region to change its land-centric approach to security to accommodate 
collective maritime security is now.  
It is instructive to note that the Indian Ocean Region recently overcame their 
historical mistrust enough to engage in basic collective maritime security cooperation and 
collaborations. By strengthening the GGC, making the details of its technical sub-
committee action plan known, integrating it with the maritime security strategy, and 
drawing lessons from ECOMOG experiences, the sub-region will be better positioned to 
handle emerging security threats. 
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III. PROPOSED STRATEGY TO COUNTER EMERGING 
SECURITY CHALLENGES 
Military strategy is the “art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation 
to secure national policy objectives by the application or threats of force.”108 The 
emerging security threats in the GoG sub-region are significant and the time to address 
the problems by formulating a collective maritime strategy is now. Led by Nigeria, 
member states of this sub-region need to muster the political will to properly fund their 
naval forces and to cooperate with each other and with other stakeholders to secure the 
sea areas critical to their economic future.  
This chapter considers the formulation of a common collective maritime security 
strategy under the framework of ends, ways, means, and acceptable risk as the first and 
most important step towards the establishment of an effective strategy to deal with the 
emerging security threats (see Figure 7). This strategy spells out strategic objectives 
(ends), how they are to be achieved (ways), what resources are required to achieve them 
(means), and associated risk arising from mismatch of these variables. The effectiveness 
of this strategy will depend on the political will of the governments of the member states 
and the strengths of existing sub-regional institutions like the GGC.  Therefore, the 
chapter considers the lessons of previous collective security efforts:  the ECOMOG 
peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau in the 1990s, and 
experiences of the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Northeast and Southeast Asia with similar 
security problems.109 
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Figure 7.   Strategic Framework 
A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (ENDS) 
In formulating this collective maritime security strategy, the interests of the 
member states of the sub-region are considered. In addition to understanding the security 
environment, efforts are made to identify strategic objectives and their requirements. The 
overarching strategic objective is to make the sub-regional maritime domain safe and 
investor friendly. The requirements to fulfill this objective are derived from emerging 
security threats. Strategic and operational challenges are considered and operational 
concepts developed with due regard to the resources available (means) to sub-regional 
naval forces. The sources of the strategic guidance are the Nigeria Navy Trident Strategic 











Figure 8.   Collective Maritime Security Operational Concepts110  
The strategic requirements are 1) preventing the maritime environment from 
being used by militants, criminals, terrorists, or hostile states to commit criminal acts, 
terror, or hostile acts against the people, economy, or property of member states, 2) 
developing the capabilities of member states to deal with emerging security threats by 
themselves, and 3) cooperating and collaborating with extra-regional powers and oil 
majors to transform the existing naval capabilities and improve their interoperability to 
meet the challenges of the changing maritime security environment.111 The attainment of 
these strategic requirements is a function of the resources available to the naval forces. 
B. NAVAL FORCES OF GULF OF GUINEA SUB-REGION (MEANS) 
Securing the GoG maritime environment requires naval forces with the capacity 
to enforce sea control and sea denial using a balanced fleet, dockyards, merchant 
shipping and a well-articulated strategy.  A cursory look at most member states' naval 
forces reveals a near absence of the minimum requirements to project sea power. Except 
for Nigeria and to a lesser extent Ghana, member states lack the appropriate mix of 
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platforms, cannot police beyond their territorial or brown waters, and have no defined 
maritime or naval strategy. Since Nigeria currently has the most capable naval force in 
the sub-region, analysis of how the Nigerian Navy is organized to enforce its defense-in-
depth and Trident Strategic concepts serves as a framework for considering the needs and 
resources of the sub-region as a whole.  
1. Nigerian Navy  
By virtue of its geographical endowments, large population, economic potential 
and military capabilities, Nigeria is perceived as a hegemon in the GoG sub-region. Huge 
economic investments, including the vast majority of foreign investments in the sub-
region, require that Nigeria provide a leadership role in defending the maritime domain. 
Furthermore, by constitutional mandate, the NN must enforce the nation’s strategy to 
protect Nigeria's national interests within its EEZ and beyond.  
The NN command structure consists of the Naval Headquarters in Abuja, two 
operational commands with headquarters in Lagos and Calabar, one training command 
with headquarters in Lagos and training facilities located in most parts of Nigeria, and 
one logistic command with headquarters in Sapele. At the operational level, the NN has 
four operational bases (located in Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Calabar), one naval 
air wing located in Lagos, five Forward Operational Bases (FOBs) with two more to be 
brought online soon, two repair facilities located in Lagos and Port Harcourt, and two 
fleets based in Lagos and Calabar.112  
Attempts were made by naval authorities to ensure that NN operational 
commands have a good mix of ships. The ships in the NN inventory include one MEKO 
360 class frigate (NNS ARADU), two Vosper Mk 9 corvettes (NNS ERINOMI and 
ENYIMIRI), two modified Italian Lerici class coastal minesweepers (NNS OHUE and 
BARAMA), three French Combattante IIIB fast attack missile craft (NNS SIRI, AYAM, 
and EKUN), and three German Lurssen 57 Class fast attack missile craft (NNS EKPE, 
AGU, and DAMISA).113  
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Other NN platforms include four River Town class vessels (NNS HADEIJA, 
MAKURDI, BRASS, and YOLA), and four Balsam ocean patrol craft (NNS NWAMBA, 
OBULA, KYANWA, and OLOGBO), 15 defender patrol boats, two landing ship tanks 
(NNS AMBE and OFIOM), one survey vessel (NNS LANA), four tugs boats (RIMA, 
MIRA, RUDOLF, and COMMANDER APAYI-JOE); two training ships (NNS OBUMA 
and RUWAN YARO); and several inshore patrol boats (IPCs) as well as JEDI Boats. The 
NN air wing has in its inventory two Westland Lynx Mk 89 Anti Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) helicopters and four AGUSTA A109E power utility helicopters.114   
However, an in-depth analysis of NN combat assets indicates that these platforms 
are inadequate for effective and sustained maritime security surveillance of Nigeria’s 
84,000 square nautical mile (nm) EEZ, much less the entire sub-region. The platforms are 
ageing, with most of them in the services of member states navies for an average of 25 
years. Furthermore, because these platforms were poorly maintained partly due to 
dwindling defense budgetary provisions thereby degrading platforms efficiency and 
performance. Under the present leadership, the Nigerian Navy has returned most of these 
vessels to sea despite reduced defense funding. These monumental efforts led to the 
Nigerian Navy’s successful participation in 2005 TRAFALGA Centennial celebrations in 
the U.K. Similarly, most of the vessels participated in 2006 naval sea exercises involving 
most naval ships from across the African region. Unfortunately, these efforts will not be 
enough if the politicians, oil majors, and extra regional powers cannot muster the political 
will to adequately fund sub-region naval forces.  
Because Nigeria’s economic center of gravity lies within its EEZ, where most 
untapped offshore oil blocks are located, the EEZ and larger GoG sub-region require 
effective patrolling with more platforms than are currently available in the NN inventory. 
At this time, it is still less costly for Nigeria to refit NN platforms through aggressive 
alterations and additions rather than acquiring new ones. However, new acquisitions will 
further increase NN capabilities to mount a sustained presence at sea to provide strategic 
deterrence against emerging threats. Expanding NN capabilities would require the 
acquisition of dedicated platforms such as submarines, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), 
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additional frigates, underway replenishment ships (URS), more helicopters, maritime 
patrol aircraft, adequate logistics support vessels, coastal radar stations and highly trained 
and motivated manpower. These additional platforms will form part of the critical 
components for the attainment of this study’s strategic requirements. 
2. Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin Republic 
Côte d'Ivoire has a coastline of about 281 nm, territorial sea of 12 nm, and an 
EEZ of 200 nm.115 The country has a sea area of about 56,200 square nm to secure. To 
secure its maritime domain, the country’s naval forces, the Marine Côte d'Ivoire, have 
four operating bases located in Abidjan, Sassandra, Tabou, and San-Pedro, with principal 
base and repair facilities in Abidjan. Its personnel strength is about 950 from all ranks, 
with 75 officers. Its platform inventory shows one Patra Class boat, 2 LCMs, 2 Rodman 
890, and one tug boat.116 
Ghana has a coastline of about 292 nm, territorial sea of 12 nm, and an EEZ of 
200 nm.117 With coastline of about 292 nm and EEZ of 200 nm, Ghana has a sea area of 
about 58,400 square nm to secure. The Ghanaian navy is organized into two operational 
commands for policing their maritime environment. The commands are the Eastern Naval 
Command with headquarters in Tema, and the Western Naval Command headquartered 
in Sekondi. The naval force has personnel strength of about 1,214 from all ranks 
including 132 officers. There are four maritime patrol aircraft, four Lurssen class 57 and 
45 FPBs as well as two Balsam Class patrol boats.118 Mounting sustained maritime 
security in this vast maritime domain is a daunting task for Ghanaian political and naval 
authorities.  
Togo is one of the few countries where hydrocarbon deposits have not been found 
in large quantities. The country has a coastline of about 30 nm, territorial sea of 30 nm, 
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and an EEZ of 200 nm.119 With its EEZ of 200 nm, the country has a 6,000 square nm 
sea area to secure. It has one naval base, in Lome, and two coastal patrol craft. With only 
one naval base and two patrol craft, Togo cannot secure its 200 nm EEZ. Therefore, Togo 
is almost completely dependent upon cooperation with other member states for maritime 
security.  
The Republic of Benin has a coastline of about 65 nm.  It has claimed sea territory 
of 200 nm but has yet to claim an EEZ. Therefore, it has a 13,000 square nautical mile 
maritime environment to protect. The country has marine forces, known as Forces 
Navales with personnel strength of 220 from all ranks, including 30 officers.120 The 
marine forces have two-Chinese 27-Meter Class (patrol craft) and one DO 128 
reconnaissance aircraft.  
3. Cameroon, DR Congo, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
Cameroon has a coastline of about 217 nm and claims territorial seas of 50 nm. 
With the coastline of 217 nm, the country has to secure a sea area of about 10,850 square 
nm. Their marine forces have personnel strength of 1250 and their operating bases are 
located in Douala, Limbe, and Kribi.121 Platforms include one Bizerte Type PR 48, one 
coastal, one offshore patrol craft, two swift PBR Class (River patrol craft, two Rodman 
101 (coastal patrol craft), four Rodman 46 Class, and two Yunnan Class Landing Craft 
Utility (LCU). 
The DR Congo has a coastline of about 22 nm and territorial seas of 12 nm and 
therefore a sea area of about 264 square nautical miles to secure. Marine forces are 
organized into four commands: Matadi (coastal), Kinshasa (riverine), Kalemi (Lake 
Tanganyika), and Goma (Lake Kivu). Their navy has personnel strength of about 1,000 
and a total of eight patrol crafts including one Shanghai II class (FAC).122  
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Angola has the longest stretch of coastline in the sub-region. Its coastline is about 
864 nm and the country claims a territorial sea of 12 nm and an EEZ of 200 nm.123 The 
country has a massive 172,800 square nautical mile maritime environment to secure. To 
defend this vast area, Angola has marine forces with personnel strength of about 890 
whose operating bases are located in Luanda, Lobito and Namibe.124 The platforms in 
their inventory are two Namacurra class inshore patrol craft. This country is one of the 
top oil exporting countries of the sub-region and has by far the largest maritime domain, 
yet it pays the least attention to the security of its maritime environment as evidenced by 
the miniscule resources allocated for maritime security. It is vital that Angola take the 
issue of its maritime domain security seriously. While trying to recover from two decades 
of civil war, Angola cannot afford to ignore emerging threats to its national security with 
oil prices at an all time high and rising. It is clearly in Angola's national interests to join 
with other member states to secure the sub-regional maritime domain.    
Equatorial Guinea has coastline of about 160 nm, territorial seas of 12 nm, and 
claims an EEZ of 200 nm.125 The country has a 32,000 square nautical mile sea area to 
secure. Marine forces have personnel strength of 120 of all ranks who operate from 
Malabo and Bata bases. The forces have three platforms: one Daphne class patrol boat, 
two ZHUK (GRIF) class, and two Kalkan M class patrol boats. The personnel and 
minimal platform inventory are grossly inadequate to secure 32,000 square nautical miles 
of sea area. 
Finally, Gabon has a coastline of 292 nm, territorial seas of 12 nm, and an EEZ of 
200 nm.126 The country has a total of a 58,400 square nm sea area to secure and 
approximately 600 marine forces of all ranks, including 65 officers, who operate from 
Ports Gentil and Mayumba. The marine forces' platform inventory includes two P400  
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patrol boats, one PATRA class FAC missile craft, two sea trucks (LCVP), one 
EMBRAER EMB III land based maritime aircraft, one Champlain class troop transport 
(LPA), and one landing craft utility (LCU).127 
C. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS (WAYS) 
In assessing these countries based on their naval forces Order of Battle (ORBAT), 
it is obvious that most of the naval forces cannot mount effective and sustained policing 
within their respective territorial waters. The sub-region’s long history of using a land-
centric security approach with less emphasis on maritime security tends to compound this 
problem. By implication, if nothing is done to address the problem, these nations will all 
continue to lose major sources of revenue to criminals, terrorists and militants, thereby 
driving away genuine investors. To secure the future of the GoG sub-region an integrated 
operational concept to resolve these security challenges is needed. 
1. Assessment 
Separately, most of these nations have failed to demonstrate sufficient capacity to 
secure their respective maritime domains and create an investor friendly environment 
within which oil majors and extra-regional powers can operate and invest. Since the 
threats are real, the first priority is to put aside the issues that have divided them and 
cooperate. It is abundantly clear that no one country can go it alone. Since the maritime 
environment holds the key to the sub-regional economic survival, member states must not 
allow the political issues that have attempted to undermine ECOMOG operations in 
1990s to impede their ability to address the security problems collectively. Following the 
example of cooperation in the Persian Gulf, South- and Northeast Asia, member states 
need to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements to pool their resources and strengths 
to shore up their respective deficiencies. They need to cooperate and collaborate with 
each other and also with oil majors and extra-regional powers currently investing huge 
sums of money in sub-regional oil exploration and exploitation. 
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In the Cold War era, cooperative security emerged from European principles of 
common security: to reduce the risk of war and pool resources to attack a common 
enemy. The concept was based on the assumption that unilateral security was not 
"fashionable" or effective because states were fast becoming economically, politically 
and militarily interdependent.128  
This recognized trend underscores the need for member states to consider 
cooperative security in the sub-regional maritime environment. The key advantage of 
common maritime security strategy, it has been argued, is that it will afford sub-region 
heads of government the commitment to muster the political will to fund their naval 
forces. With adequate funding, the navies will develop the capacity to check emerging 
security threats and demonstrate to extra-regional powers and oil majors the commitment 
of the sub-region to make the sea area investor friendly. In addition, it will lessen the 
need for extra-regional powers’ involvement in sub-regional security.   
2. The Gulf of Guinea Commission 
The integrated collective maritime security strategy calls for strengthening the 
GoG Commission initiated by Nigeria and drawing lessons from past ECOMOG 
operations. The strategy would accommodate the sub-region's short, medium and long 
term maritime security needs. In addition to its mandate as spelled out in Article V, the 
Commission need to expand the section dealing with security to cover: 1) the prevention 
of the maritime environment from being used by militants, criminals, terrorists, or hostile 
states to commit criminal acts, terror, or hostile acts against member states, its people, 
economy, and property, 2) the development of sub-regional naval capabilities to deal with 
emerging security threats by themselves, 3) collaboration and cooperation with the extra-
regional powers and oil majors to transform existing naval capabilities and improve their 
interoperability to meet the challenges of the changing maritime security domain, 4) the 
installation of coastal radars and surveillance systems across the entire sub-regional 
coastline and 5) collaborative funding as well as contributions of platforms and 
equipment.  
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The installation of coastal radars and surveillance systems along the coastline 
would compliment the equipment inventory of the sub-regional naval forces in early 
detection and monitoring of the maritime domain. Nigeria has already established five 
FOBs at Ibaka, Bonny, Nguama, Ogindegbe and Igbokoda to enhance quick, flexible 
response and to improve reaction time of NN to illegal activities. The GGC need to 
further champion the development of FOBs across the sub-regional coastlines and 
encourage member states like Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, and Gabon to 
contribute platforms and equipment in order to cover the EEZ of less equipped member 
states. 
Similarly, for short and medium term purposes, it is necessary for the 
Commission to embark on aggressive, comprehensive refitting of the equipment 
inventory. For long term purposes, new acquisitions are necessary. Such acquisitions 
need to include more FPBs, in- and off-shore PBs, MPAs, helicopters, auxiliary boats, 
and the development of more repair facilities. With good cooperation and collaboration, 
the Commission could seek the assistance of oil majors and extra-regional powers, as 
they do in the Persian Gulf, Southeast and Northeast Asia Region.  
To facilitate the operations of the Commission and sub-region naval forces, the 
need to strengthen and adequately fund the GGC cannot be overemphasized. A situation 
like the present ECOWAS setup in which few member states honor their annual 
obligations will not help the Commission. Member states and all stakeholders in sub-
regional natural resources exploration and exploitation will need to show commitment on 
issues affecting maritime security and dedicate a certain percentage of their annual net 
profits for that purpose.  The financial contributions of stakeholders should be used by 
the Commission for comprehensive refitting of the sub-regional naval forces platform 
inventory and for new acquisitions. In addition, the Commission will be required to 
involve all private, public, government, oil majors and extra-regional powers in the 
interagency (IA) process. Carried out conscientiously, these actions will advance the sub-
region's commitment to implementing the operational concepts.   
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3. The Way Ahead 
The ability of the GGC to demonstrate to the extra-regional powers its capacity to 
secure the GoG maritime domain depends on its ability to fund and implement the 
operational concepts developed in this strategy. Once again, the threats are largely 
domestic and transnational in nature and can be effectively contained through the 
cooperation and collaboration of member states, other stakeholders, extra-regional actors, 
and the GGC. The challenge, therefore, is not just detecting and defeating terrorists, 
criminals and militants; but in maintaining good order within GoG maritime domain. In 
other words, the essential tasks for this strategy are to ensure free access to the maritime 
environment by all lawful actors and to prevent the illegal activities of militants, 
criminals and terrorists. 
This operational concept recognizes the geo-strategic setting of the GoG sub-
region. Strategic objectives and requirements are derived based on the security challenges 
posed by emerging threats within the GoG maritime domain. It focuses on the sub-
regional naval forces having a visible presence in the maritime domain in order to detect 
and deter criminal activities and terrorism in the sea lanes and at the same time respond to 
a wide range of contingencies, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and 
search and rescue (SAR).129 The concept intends to generate and facilitate cooperation, 
information sharing, capacity building and interoperability of the sub-regional naval 
forces. 
The strategic concept employs a hybrid approach to the NN defense-in-depth and 
Trident Strategic concepts (see Figure 9). This concept consists of three levels or layers. 
Level one involves IA cooperation, collaboration, and integration; intelligence gathering 
and sharing; and creation of strong Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Level 2 
involves the defense of territorial waters, including surveillance, early warning, anti-
smuggling, anti–piracy operations, and anti–militant activities; the protection of oil 
installations; SAR; independent and joint exercises and operations; and policing up to 
100 nautical miles seaward. Level 3 involves coordinated efforts aimed at defending the 
entire sub-regional maritime interests and protecting sea lanes of communications. This 
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level requires maintaining naval presence within the EEZ for monitoring, enforcing sea 
control and denial, and coordinating allied and combined exercises and operations; and 
also to  support marine research and to prevent poaching, hazardous and toxic materials 
dumping, and terrorism.   
Levels one and two are mandatory to all nations of the sub-region, and level three 
would be implemented by oil producing member states, oil majors and extra-regional 
powers. The GGC would set requirements for each level and enforce them accordingly. 
At each level, the forces would be required to preempt, detect, deter, and respond rapidly 
against all forms of criminal activities through visible presence and surveillance 
operations. They would be mandated to carry out vessel queries and compliant boarding. 
Vessel queries would be conducted by Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPAs), and reports of 
such queries would be forwarded to surface forces for necessary actions. In the same 
manner, during compliant boarding, if irregularities relating to illegal activities or 
terrorist acts are discovered, such information would be passed to law enforcement agents 
for further action at the vessel’s next port of call.130 Conducting these operations 
collectively will no doubt build solid cooperation and capacity among member states. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Integrated Collective Maritime Security Strategy 
For information gathering and processing, the GGC would create central and sub-
central information centers. Similarly, it would integrate all sources of information 
gathering, including locals and fishermen, fishing trawlers, merchant vessels, servicing 
boats, oil company information sources, MPAs and naval forces. Furthermore, the GGC 
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would create a sub-regional interagency network that links all elements, from sensors to 
operational forces, and to policymakers. Central to this process would be the 
establishment of a headquarters and joint information analysis center in Abuja. 
Intelligence derived from such information processing would be used to deploy naval 
forces as reaction units to check, take necessary actions, and provide real-time 
intelligence that could help maintain a proactive security posture.   
As part of information gathering, the Commission needs to embrace the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Automatic Identification System (AIS), 
which the IMO requires ships to carry since 2000. The AIS is a shipboard broadcast 
system and a continuous autonomous transponder in the VHF band that allows ships to 
track, identify and exchange pertinent navigational information with each other and shore 
stations.131 This information can be graphically displayed on a computer or overlaid onto 
a radar or electronic chart display and information system; it would complement the 
efforts of coastal radar stations to monitor shipping traffic.    
The GGC would be required to create strong and effective MDA within the sub-
region as the fulcrum for success of this collective strategy. Maritime domain awareness 
is the thorough understanding of all entities associated with the maritime environment 
that could impact sub-regional security, safety, economy or environment.132 MDA 
creates an environment conducive for naval forces to take proactive actions against 
criminals and would guarantee an investor friendly maritime environment. 
Finally, policymakers need to put the requisite legal authorities and instruments in 
place at national, sub-regional, and international levels to support this strategy. The 
immense opportunities offered by MDA will come to nothing if the strategy lacks legal 
authority or organizational structures needed to operate. Specifically, these legal 
instruments would enable naval forces to freely operate across jurisdictional boundaries 
without constant and continuous requests for permission. 
                                                 
131 Boyer, 87. 
132 Ibid. 
 57 
D. ACCEPTABLE RISK ASSESSMENT  
In an integrated collective maritime security strategy, an acceptable risk 
assessment is necessary to determine the second and third order effects of partial or 
complete implementation of the strategy. To facilitate understanding of consequences of 
partial implementation of this security strategy, the probability of maritime security and 
the severity of such incidents must be analyzed. The consequences associated with such 
maritime security incidences can be determined based on an understanding of the 
maritime domain environment and its relationship to the sub-regional economy.  
For instance, during the last quarter of 2006, the militant attack on Shell’s 
477,000 barrels per day oil terminal left the facility closed for more than two months.133 
Similarly, the effects of maritime boundary disputes, terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and 
environmental degradation on the sub-regional economy are enormous. The risk 
associated with the sub-region’s present inability to effectively secure the maritime 
domain can be assessed as high, since the effects arising from current threats have 
significant security and economic consequences.  This is because member states have 
been dealing with these problems unilaterally without adequate resources and in some 
cases without well-articulated strategy. In effect, there has been a mismatch in the 
individual countries' strategic objectives, concepts and resources. Since individual 
countries have been dealing with problems unilaterally, there are no common strategic 
objectives, concepts and resources to check the threats. 
Although the intentions of potential threats are difficult to predict accurately, 
effective intelligence gathering and information sharing is important in assessing 
emerging maritime threats and could go a long way towards reducing the associated 
risks.134 Continuous reassessment of the effectiveness of strategic actions with every 
practical means will help achieve a secured sub-regional maritime environment. 
Therefore, the need for all concerned to ensure full implementation of this strategy cannot 
be overemphasized. 
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E. POLITICAL ISSUES 
This study recognizes the growing concern regarding Nigeria’s perceived 
hegemony among GoG member states. More so are political issues like the 
Francophone/Anglophone divide and different former colonial administrations that have 
over time tended to undermine previous collective security efforts … specifically 
ECOMOG operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. Investigations 
revealed that these problems are not peculiar to the sub-region alone. Similar issues 
persisted in Europe during the Cold War era before policymakers realized that unilateral 
security was no longer fashionable as states were fast becoming economically, politically 
and militarily interdependent. This was also the situation in Northeast and Southeast Asia 
regions before they came together and developed bilateral and multilateral agreements 
that are today helping them to pool their resources together to shore up their deficiencies. 
Therefore, political leaders of member states need to come together, set aside their 
differences and make the issue of mutual security a common focus of their respective 
administrations. They need to cooperate and collaborate with each other and also with oil 
majors and extra-regional powers currently investing heavily in oil exploration and 
exploitation in the region. 
To ameliorate the concerns of the smaller states regarding Nigeria’s perceived 
hegemony in the GoG and to overcome political, cultural, and historical suspicions and 
misgivings across the sub-region, policymakers need to invest in building long term 
political, economic, and military relationships with one another.  They need to leverage 
common security interests to lay the groundwork for negotiating mutually beneficial 
bilateral and multilateral agreements.  Furthermore, the level of military cooperation 
required to implement this proposed integrated maritime security strategy will require 
additional mutual military-to-military investments in communications, exchange 
programs, and combined doctrine, training, education, and exercises. 
In addition, policymakers need to employ the political tools of process 
transparency and political oversight to nurture cooperation and collaboration while 
simultaneously protecting the minority rights and interests of the smaller member states 
in order to reduce the potential for larger members to take advantage of or abuse the 
 59 
weaker states.  In this context, international governmental organizations such as the 
United Nations, African Union, ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission will play a vital role in nurturing cooperation and collaboration by providing 
a common framework from which member nations can fairly participate. 
Finally, policymakers need to acknowledge the need to build the partnership 
capacity of many weaker member states by training, advising, and assisting their 
respective security forces to participate in this proposed integrated maritime security 
strategy.  In this regard, the better resourced and more capable states will not only need to 
cooperate and collaborate regarding real-time maritime security operations but will also 
need to provide additional doctrine, training, personnel, and subject matter expertise 
resources to help build the capacity of the weaker states to secure their own territorial 
waters. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The GoG sub-region has been in the news lately due to its large deposits of 
hydrocarbons, other mineral resources, fisheries and agricultural products. Interest in the 
sub-region is intensified by the ongoing Middle East crisis, instability in the Persian Gulf 
region and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. Oil from the sub-region yields 
higher profits, does not have numerous transit chokepoints, offers ease of shipping and 
lower transportation costs, is mostly exploited from offshore locations, yields higher 
quality oil with low sulfur content and API gravity often close to 40o, and often comes 
with fewer environmental risks to stakeholders.  
A. GOG SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY 
Chapter II describes the geo-strategic and security environment of the GoG sub-
region in detail, identifying its key strategic natural resources, important regional and 
extra-regional stakeholders, emerging maritime threats (piracy, boundary disputes, 
domestic poverty and unrest, poor governance), and limited or nonexistent maritime 
strategies to address these challenges in a volatile maritime environment.  The strategic 
attributes of GoG sub-regional oil make it an important part of western energy 
calculations. The area hosts stiff international competition among industrialized nations 
seeking new, safer, and more reliable sources of energy. Extra-regional powers currently 
scrambling for oil from the GoG sub-region, including the U.S., some European 
countries, China, Japan, and India are making huge investments. At the same time, 
shipping activities have increased tremendously.  
These huge investments and increased shipping activities have boosted the 
revenue profile of member states while simultaneously exposing the sub-region to 
security risks. There is growing concern that the vast resources and potential in the GoG 
sub-region are being undermined by multifaceted domestic, sub-regional and 
international threats and vulnerabilities that stem from political and socioeconomic 




youth activities, oil pipeline destructions, the illegal bunkering of petroleum products, oil 
terminals and flow stations disruptions, piracy, poaching, terrorism and environmental 
degradation. 
B. GOG MARITIME STRATEGIES SUMMARY 
To address these threats, Chapter III developed this proposed strategy to counter 
the emerging security challenges in the GoG sub-region under a framework of strategic 
analysis of ends (strategic objectives), means (available maritime security resources), and 
ways (maritime operational concepts).  These threats challenge all sub-region member 
states' limited capacity for effective and sustained maritime security. The sub-region has 
a long history of land-centric security arrangements. In assessing sub-regional naval 
forces based on their ORBAT in relation to their vast maritime territories, the picture 
emerges of mostly relatively low capacity naval forces that can barely police their 
territorial waters, much less police beyond them. The inability of most of these forces to 
mount effective and sustained policing exposes the vulnerable sub-regional sea areas to 
criminal activities and exploitations. If nothing is done to resolve these issues, these 
nations will continue to lose their major source of revenue to criminals, terrorists and 
militants, driving away genuine investors because they cannot create an investor friendly 
environment for the oil majors and extra-regional powers. Since these threats are real, 
member states need to overcome divisive political issues, cooperate and collaborate, and 
make the sub-regional maritime domain safe by collectively implementing this proposed 
integrated maritime security strategy. They should also cooperate and collaborate with oil 
majors, other stakeholders and extra-regional powers investing heavily in sub-regional 
oil. 
C. NEW STRATEGY JUSTIFICATION 
Based upon the analysis in Chapter III, it is obvious that most member states lack 
resources and manpower to deal with emerging security threats within their respective 
brown and territorial waters. Member states continue to confront emerging threats 
unilaterally rather than bilaterally or multilaterally. Because none of the sub-region states 
have sufficient means to achieve maritime domain security, sub-regional political leaders 
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should make collective maritime security a central policy focus. Furthermore, political 
leaders should take a cue from the IOR leaders who recently overcame their historical 
mistrust enough to engage in basic collective maritime security cooperation and 
collaboration. By overcoming their differences, mustering enough political will, and 
pooling resources together, GoG leaders will convince extra-regional stakeholders to 
contribute to the implementation of this collective maritime security strategy. In the 
meantime, the efforts of the extra-regional powers to provide limited security, aid, 
training, and arms sales to deal with the myriad of security problems is highly 
commendable. 
Nigeria must encourage member states to articulate maritime defense strategies 
extending beyond their own territorial waters and must work to strengthen the GGC, 
revealing details of its technical subcommittee action plan and integrating it with this 
proposal. In so doing, and in light of lessons learned from ECOMOG experience, the sub-
region will be better positioned to handle emerging security threats. 
D. PROPOSED INTEGRATED MARITIME COLLECTIVE STRATEGY 
The proposed integrated maritime collective strategy aims to make the maritime 
domain safe and investor friendly under the framework of ends, means, ways, and 
acceptable risk. The strategic objectives are 1) to prevent the maritime environment from 
being used by militants, criminals, terrorists, or hostile states to commit criminal acts, 
terror, or hostile acts against other member states, its people, economy, and property; 2) 
to develop member states' capabilities to deal with emerging security threats by 
themselves; and 3) to collaborate with extra-regional powers and oil majors to transform 
existing naval capabilities and improve interoperability. Attainment of these objectives is 
a function of the political will of the member states' governments, the strength of the 
GGC, lessons drawn from ECOMOG operations, and cooperation, collaboration and 
commitment of oil majors and extra-regional powers.  
The sources of strategic guidance are the NN Trident Strategic and defense-in-
depth concepts. A hybrid approach to the strategic guidance is adopted, using three 
levels.  Level one involves IA cooperation, collaboration, and integration; intelligence 
gathering and sharing; and strong MDA. Level two involves surveillance, early warning, 
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anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, and anti-militant activities; the protection of oil installations; 
SAR; independent and joint exercises and operations; and policing up to 100 nautical 
miles seaward. Level three involves coordinated efforts to defend the entire sub-region's 
maritime interests and protect sea lanes of communication, along with maintenance of 
naval presence within and beyond the EEZ. 
Levels one and two is mandatory to all nations of the sub-region; level three 
would be left to the better resourced member states, oil majors and extra-regional powers 
to implement. The GGC would set and enforce requirements for each level. In each level, 
maritime forces would be required to preempt, detect, deter, and respond rapidly against 
all criminal activities through visible presence and surveillance operations. They would 
be mandated to conduct vessel queries and compliant boarding. Collective operations will 
build solid cooperation, capacity, and trust among member states. 
E. POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH 
As indicated in Chapter I, very little literature is available on GoG maritime 
security. Although this thesis fills part of the gap in the literature, the arena of GoG 
maritime security and protection is still a virgin territory and deserves more research.  
One purpose of this thesis is to explore how GoG member states should develop their 
maritime defense capability. However, the more important purpose is to provide a 
methodology to identify and ask the right questions about military strategy and to glean 
the answers from the limited experience of successful maritime strategies in this 
particular sub-region.  This thesis assesses maritime strategy through the lens of ends, 
ways, and means, using lessons learned from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions 
to tease out some doctrinal truths.  Future research on similar maritime security 
challenges and strategies in other resource-rich regions, such as Central and South 
America, may provide useful insights for developing options and refining GoG maritime 
security strategies.  Future research is also necessary to examine the extent to which 
ineffective government policies, bad governance, and political corruption have provided 
the expanded political opportunities for security threats to emerge. 
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